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l'~OTE

BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF
COMPARATIVE INTEREST
BALANCING: AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH TO
EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY
CONFLICTS
I
INTRODUCTION

In a tort action before a U.S. court, the Plaintiff seeks to compel the
corporate Defendant to produce documents held by the Defendant's
Canadian subsidiary. The Defendant counters by moving for a protective
order prohibiting the discovery, arguing that a Quebec blocking statute 1
prevents the disclosure of the documents. 2 At stake are the conflicting
interests of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, the United States, and the Canadian
province of Quebec. 3 Courts faced with this increasingly common type of
Copyright© I988 by Law and Contemporary Problems
I. Blocking statutes, or nondisclosure laws, are laws that prohibit the disclosure or removal of
documents located in the territory of the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign
authorities. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 437
reporter's note 4 ( I986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED)]. Such legislation is designed to
counter U.S. efforts to secure foreign production and has been enacted in several foreign states,
including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, India, New Zealand, the
Netherlands, the Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
The complete texts of most of these foreign blocking statutes are reprinted in A. LowE,
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION-AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS ( I983).
2. This hypothetical is based on the fact situation presented in State v. Keene Corp., No.
II08600, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Md. July 10, 1986) (granting protective order). The blocking statute
involved in Keene Corp. was the Quebec Business Concerns Records Act, QuE. REv. STAT. ch. D-I2
(1977) [hereinafter Quebec Act].
3. The Plaintiff has an interest in having the adjudication go forward with the best evidence
available. In addition to the obvious desire of avoiding the admission of potentially damaging
evidence, the Defendant has an interest in avoiding the criminal sanctions (up to one year's
imprisonment) which may be imposed for violating the provisions of the blocking statute. Quebec
Act, supra note 2, § 5. The interests of the United States include the interest in protecting U.S.
citizens from harmful products and compensating them for injuries resulting from the use of such
products, and the interest in deciding cases on the basis of all relevant information in accord with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(l). The interests of the Province of Quebec
in the nondisclosure of business records located within its borders are reflected in the Quebec Act.
The fact that the Quebec Act makes the removal of records from Quebec in pursuance of an order by
a foreign authority a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment illustrates that the Quebec
Parliament considered protection of business records to be of critical importance to a viable business
environment and to the territorial integrity of the province. Quebec Act, supra note 2.

96

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 50: No. 3

extraterritorial jurisdictional conflict receive scant guidance from the
confused and inconsistent case law and vague authoritative pronouncements
on the subject of extraterritorial discovery.
Most courts ostensibly employ one of several comparative interest
balancing approaches 4 to determine whether production should be ordered in
cases in which domestic corporations refuse to produce documents held by
their foreign subsidiaries, branches, or parent corporations because of the
existence of a foreign blocking statute. The term "comparative interest
balancing" denotes a decisionmaking process in which the court identifies the
conflicting interests of each state, weighs each state's interest against that of
the other, and makes a decision according "to the turn of the scale." 5
Although each of the several comparative interest balancing approaches lists
factors to be balanced, none explains how the factors are to be evaluated or
how they are to be weighed against one another. 6 The m<Uor weaknesses of
comparative interest balancing are simply that courts lack the institutional
resources and expertise to assess the interests of foreign states and that no
judicially manageable standards exist for assigning weight to competing
national interests. 7 As a number of commentators have pointed out,
balancing national interests is a political, not legal task, 8 and is unlikely to
produce the predictability and certainty necessary to minimize jurisdictional
conflicts. 9
In recognition of these deficiencies of comparative interest balancing, this
note proposes not a better rule of law, but rather a more realistic and
coherent process for extraterritorial decisionmaking in cases involving
4.

For a summary of judicial application of interest balancing, see RESTATEMENT (REVISED),

supra note I, § 437 reporter's note 7. But see In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148

(N.D. Ill. 1979).
5. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. CoMP. L. 579, 589 ( 1983).
6. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note I, § 437( l)(c); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 ( 1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)];
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976), a.f!'d, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
7. These weaknesses were noted in In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1139, 1148
(N.D. Ill. 1979), where the court rejected the comparative interest balancing approach and
concluded:
Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate
the economic and social policies of a foreign country, ... [i]t is simply impossible to judicially
"balance" these totally contradictory and mutually negating actions.
Similar sentiments were echoed in Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1984), in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Given the inherent limitations of the Judiciary, which must weigh these issues in the limited
context of adversarial litigation, we seriously doubt whether we could adequately chart the
competing problems and priorities that inevitably define the scope of any nation's interest in a
legislated remedy.
8. See Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach ojNational Laws, 10 YALE
J. INT'L L. 185, 205 (1984); Durack, rlustralia: Conflicts and Comitv, in AcT OF STATE AND
ExTRATERRITORIAL REACH: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND PoLICY 41, 44 (J. Lacey ed. 1983); Onkelinx,
Conflict of Internationaljwisdiction: Orden.ng the Production of Documents in f'iolation of the Law oft he Situs, 64
Nw. U.L. REv. 487, 53! (1969).
9. See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extratenitorial jurisdiction, 98
HARV. L. REv. 1310, 1322 (1985); Gerber, supra note 8.
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conflict between discovery and foreign blocking statutes. This note focuses
on the distinction between interest balancing within the realm of "private
law" and "public law." 10 The critical difference lies in the fact that interest
balancing in public law cases has operated as a means of asserting the primacy
of U.S. interests 11 in the guise of applying a "jurisdictional rule of reason. " 12
Although courts profess to apply a comparative interest balancing approach,
in public law cases they actually exercise enforcement jurisdiction 13 whenever
more than a de minimis U.S. interest is present; consideration of foreign
interests is rarely more than perfunctory. 14 Only in private law cases are
courts willing to defer to foreign interests. 15 This note seeks to conform the
courts' rhetoric to reality by providing an analytical framework which
acknowledges that interest analysis has actually been, by necessity, unilateral
and non-comparative.
Before setting forth the proposed approach, this note first examines the
several balancing approaches that courts have attempted to follow. Next, this
note exposes the deficiencies inherent in comparative interest balancing.
Finally, this note describes a methodological paradigm that more accurately
reflects the substance, if not the form, of judicial decisionmaking in the area of
extraterritorial discovery than do comparative interest balancing
formulations.
I

CoMPARATIVE INTEREST BALANCING
A.

Societe Jnternationale: A Legacy of Confusion

The United States is presently the only nation which regularly compels
foreign discovery in conflict with local foreign law. 16 Prior to 1958, however,
U.S. courts, like their foreign counterparts, deferred to foreign interests on a
I 0. As defined in this note, "private law" includes cases of a purely private civil law nature such
as contract and tort actions. "Public law" refers to cases of a significant national interest such as
securities, tax, patent, antitrust, and criminal proceedings.
II. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950-51 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
12. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note],§ 503(1).
13. Enforcementjurisdiction is the power of a state "to induce or compel compliance or punish
noncompliance with its laws or regulations .... " RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note I, at§ 401(3).
Thus, when a court in one state orders a party, under the threat of sanctions for non-compliance, to
produce documents that are located in another state, it exercises enforcement jurisdiction. !d. § 431
comment b.
14. See infra notes 72-73, 86-104 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes I 05-109 and accompanying text.
16. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALI Restatements Provisions on Foreign DiscoveJ)',
16 N.Y.U.j.INT'L L. & PoL. 1075, 1075-77 (1984). See, e.g., Frischke v. Royal Bank, 17 Ont.2d 388
(1970). In Fnschke, the Ontario Court of Appeals declined to order production of documents located
in Panama, stating that notwithstanding exceptional circumstances, "[a]n Ontario court would not
order a person here to break our laws; we should not make an order that would require someone to
compel another person in that person's jurisdiction to break the laws of that state." !d. at 399. See
also Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co., I W.L.R. 627, 634-35 (H.L. 1980) (holding that the
existence of a local foreign law prohibiting disclosure prevents the documents from being in a party's
power for the purposes of ordering discovery).
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basis of comity 17 and would not order discovery within the territory of
another state when such disclosure conflicted with the law of that state. 18 It
was in that year that the Supreme Court, in Societe Internationale Pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers 19 (Societe lnternationale),

upheid a production order despite the fact that disclosure of the records
would violate Swiss penal laws and would lead to the imposition of criminal
sanctions. 20 Thus began the era of extraterritorial discovery conflict.
In Societe Internationale, a Swiss holding company brought suit against the
Attorney General of the United States to recover property seized during
World War II under the Trading with the Enemy Act. 21 Pursuant to discovery
requests, the district court ordered the plaintiff to produce certain documents
relevant to the issue of plaintiff's possible enemy taint. The records were not
produced on the ground that production would violate Swiss secrecy laws,
which carried criminal penalties, and the district court imposed the sanction
of dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the production order was justified notwithstanding the
nondisclosure law, but held also that a party's failure to comply with a
production order due to inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by
circumstances within its control did not justify the sanction of dismissal with
prejudice. 22
Societe Internationale is the only case in which the Supreme Court has
directly confronted the issue of conflict between a discovery order of a U.S.
court and a foreign blocking statute. Although Societe !nternationale is
universally recognized as holding that severe sanctions for noncompliance
with a production order will be imposed only upon a showing of bad faith,
courts have subsequently focused on various other aspects of the Supreme
Court's decision, such as its bifurcated analysis 23 and its stress on the
importance of the requested documents in illuminating key elements of the
claims. 24 Apart from the requirement of good faith, however, the Supreme
17. Comity has been defined as "a way of saying fair play-that each of two parties will yield to
the one that has interests that are clearly paramount .... Where conflicts arise between sovereigns,
the sovereigns have an obligation to resolve the conflict with restraint, cooperation and good will."
Durack, supra note 8, at 43 (quoting former United States Attorney General, Judge Griffin Bell).
18. See, e.g., Hirshorn v. Hirshorn, 278 A.D. 1006, 1007, 105 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (1951).
19. 357 u.s. 197 (1958).
20. !d. at 205.
21. !d. at 199.
22. !d. at 212.
23. The Court in Societe lntemationale considered the validity of discovery orders and the issue of
the propriety of sanctions separately, stating: "Such reasons [for noncompliance], and the
willfulness or good faith of petitioner, can hardly affect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant
only to the path which the District Court might follow in dealing with petitioner's failure to comply."
!d. at 208. See Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (lOth Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1096 (1976) ("Societe implies that consideration of foreign law problems in a discovery
context is required in dealing with sanctions to be imposed for disobedience and not in deciding
whether the discovery order should issue"). But see SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D.
Ill, 117 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that the Second Circuit, unlike other circuits, does not
distinguish the analysis used for deciding to issue an order compelling discovery from that used for
imposing sanctions).
24. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
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Court's analysis of the validity of the discovery order is masked in ambiguity.
As a result, the decision has produced more confusion than guidance. 25
Much of the confusion surrounding the proper interpretation of Societe
Jntemationale stems from a passage in the decision in which the Court stated:
We do not say that this ruling would apply to every situation where a party is restricted
by law from producing documents over which it is otherwise shown to have control.
Rule 34-of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-is sufficiently flexible to be adapted
to the exigencies of particular litigation. The propriety of the use to which it is put
depends upon the circumstances of a given case, and we hold only that
accommodation of the Rule in this instance to the policies underlying the Trading with
the Enemy Act justified the action of the District Court in issuing this production
order. 26

Many courts and commentators have interpreted this language as calling for
"a balancing approach on a case-by-case basis. " 27 One court has nevertheless
noted that "the Court gave no hint that the disclosure policies of the
American statute should be balanced against the secrecy policies of the Swiss
law," and concluded instead that "the only pertinent inquiry is the strength of
the American interests. " 28 It is more likely that the Court never even
considered, let alone decided, the issue of whether interest balancing is
required. A review of the briefs submitted by the parties in Societe
lntemationale reveals that the issue of whether the courts below impermissibly
failed to balance interests before ordering production was never raised. 29
B.

The Approach of the Restatements: Factors Without Guidance

For many courts, the question of the proper interpretation of Societe
Intenwtionale was resolved by the American Law Institute when it published
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States in
1965. 30 The prestige of the American Law Institute and of the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) quickly established the Restatement as a leading
authority in cases involving extraterritorial discovery conflicts. 31
The
Restatement (Second) took on enhanced significance because of the confusion
created by Societe Intemationale and the fact that American judges are generally
not as familiar with international law as with domestic law.
The Restatement (Second) does not directly address the problem of
extraterritorial discovery conflicts. Instead, it contains a general section
25. For a discussion of the numerous conflicting judicial approaches spawned by Societe
Intemationale, see Browne, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
1320, 1324-39 (1983).
26. 357 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1958).
27. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Electronic Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997
(I Oth Cir. 1977).
28. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
29. Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8 n.9, Societe Nationale lndustrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
30. Although this was actually the American Law Institute's first Restatement of United States
Foreign Relations Law, it was entitled the "Restatement (Second)" because it was published with a
second wave of other restatement volumes. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 16, at 1082 n.28.
31. Id. at 1082.
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pertaining to international jurisdictional conflicts. This provision declares
that states are required by international law to moderate their exercise of
jurisdiction by weighing all respective interests. 32 The Restatement (Second)
lists five factors to be balanced, including the vital national interests of each of
the states. 33 The Restatement (Second), however, mentions nothing about
how these factors are to be ascertained or evaluated, and provides no
standards by which the factors may be weighed against each other.
In May 1986, the American Law Institute approved the Restatement
(Revised) of Foreign Relations Law which employs the same type of
comparative interest balancing formulation as the Restatement (Second). 34
The Restatement (Revised), however, elevates the balancing test from a
doctrine of comity to a criterion of jurisdiction vel non (literally meaning
jurisdiction or not).
In contrast to the Restatement (Second), the
Restatement (Revised) requires comparative interest balancing "not as a basis
for requiring that states consider moderating their enforcement of laws which
they are authorized to prescribe, but as an essential element in determining
whether, as a matter of international law, the state has jurisdiction to
prescribe" the laws at all.3 5
Although the Restatement (Revised) is in some respects a substantial
improvement over the Restatement (Second), 36 its balancing formula is no
less vague than that of its predecessor. A comment following its text indicates
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 40 states:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they may
prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by
international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by actions of either state can reasonably be expected to
achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by the state.
33. !d. § 40(a).
34. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note l, § 437(l)(c) states:
In issuing an order directing production of information located abroad, a court or agency in the
United States should take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the
documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the
information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative means of securing the
information; and the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the state where the information is located.
The comment to this section indicates that in addition to these factors, the eight factors listed in
§ 403 of the Restatement (Revised) should also be considered. !d. § 437 comment c.
35. ld. § 403 reporter's note IO. Contrary to the assertion of the American Law Institute,
however, one court has noted that "there is no evidence that interest balancing represents a rule of
international law." Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
36. Unlike the Restatement (Second), the Restatement (Revised) explicitly adopts various
aspects of the Societe Intemationale analysis, such as the requirement of a stringent standard of
relevance and the bad faith prerequisite to the imposition of severe sanctions. RESTATEMENT
(REVISED). supra note I, § 43 7 (2)b & comment a.
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that the Restatement (Revised)'s list of factors to be balanced is not meant to
be exhaustive and acknowledges that "no special significance or scheme of
priorities is implied in the order in which the factors are listed. Not all factors
are equally important in all situations, and the weight to be given to any
particular factor or group of factors will depend on the circumstances." 37
An impressive number of courts have professed to follow the approach of
the two Restatements of Foreign Relations Law, 38 yet attempts to apply their
hollow balancing formulas have resulted largely in confused, ad hoc
decisionmaking. 39 Judicial refinement and expansion of the list of factors to
be balanced 40 have not added coherence or certainty to the balancing
calculus. Lacking a conceptual structure and an assessable metric for
weighing relative interests, the balancing approach of the Restatements has
failed to provide a basis for developing predictability over time.
C.

Aerospatiale: An Opportunity for Clarification Squandered

Despite confused and inconsistent judicial application of the
Restatement's vague balancing formula, the Supreme Court has, since its
1958 holding in Societe Internationale, consistently declined to render additional
guidance on the issue of extraterritorial discovery conflicts. 41 The Court's
latest refusal to clarify the criteria that U.S. courts should employ in
determining when to require production of evidence located abroad in
contravention of foreign blocking statutes came in 1987 with its decision in
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court joT the Dist. of
lowa. 42
The Aerospatiale case arose out of a products liability suit against French
aircraft manufacturers. When the U.S. plaintiffs sought broad discovery of
evidence located abroad under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
foreign defendants moved for a protective order, arguing that the U.S. court
should prohibit discovery in France through any procedures other than those
provided in the Hague Evidence Convention. Because article 23 of the Hague
Convention provides that contracting states may declare that they will refuse
37. Id. § 403 comment b.
38. Id. § 437 reporter's note 7 (listing cases that have followed the Restatement (Second)
balancing approach. For cases citing the tentative drafts of the Restatement (Revised), see Graco v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503,509 (N.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. First Nat') Bank of Chicago, 699
F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158, 1162 (C.D.
Cal. 1983).
39. For a discussion of the confused judicial application of the Restatement balancing formula, see
Browne, supra note 25, at 1330-39.
40. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976), a.!f'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1984). For an analysis of the Timberlane approach, see Maier, Extratemtorial jurisdiction at a
Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private Intemational Law, 76 AM.]. INT'L L. 280, 296-300
(1982).
4 J. The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in a case raising the issue most recently in In
re Grand jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1106 (1985).
42. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
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requests for the type of sweeping pre-trial discovery known in common law
countries, 43 application of the Convention can potentially have an effect
identical to imposition of a blocking statute. 44 Therefore, despite the fact that
the case involved application of the Hague Convention rather than conflict
with an actual blocking statute, it nonetheless presented an ideal opportunity
for the Court to refine the formula for resolving all extraterritorial discovery
conflicts.
Citing the comparative interest balancing formula of section 437 of the
Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, the Supreme Court held that
the Hague Convention's procedures constitute an option that a U.S. court
may or may not elect to employ, depending on the outcome of "scrutiny in
each case of the particular facts [and] sovereign interests. " 45 The Court,
however, evaded the underlying issue of exactly how the comparative interest
balancing approach is to be applied by stating "[w]e do not articulate specific
rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication. " 46
The majority's holding produced a sharply worded dissent in which Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, exclaimed
that " [e ]xperience to date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-bycase comity analysis now to be permitted by the Court will be performed
inadequately. " 47 Arguing that the Court should have instead adopted a
general presumption that courts should resort first to the procedures of the
Hague Convention, Justice Blackmun stated, "I dissent because I cannot
endorse the Court's case-by-case inquiry ... and its failure to provide lower
courts with any meaningful guidance for carrying out that inquiry. " 48 He
concluded that, "[t]he majority fails to offer guidance in this endeavor, and
thus it has missed its opportunity to provide predictable and effective
procedures for international litigants in United States courts. " 49
If the legacy of Societe !ntemationale can be said to be confusion, the Court's
latest decision involving extraterritorial discovery conflicts will be
remembered as a missed opportunity to resolve that confusion. Although the
majority in Aerospatiale refrained from explicitly stating how its decision would
affect lower court cases involving foreign blocking statutes, it is likely that the
Aerospatiale precedent will be interpreted as endorsing a vague notion of
comparative interest balancing in that context as well.
43. 23 U.S.T. at 2568, TIAS 7444. Thirteen of the seventeen signatory states have made such
declarations under Article 23 of the Convention. See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY 15-19
(1986).
44. See S&S Screw Mach. Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (granting
protective order in contract case in which, pursuant to article 23 of the Hague Convention, West
Germany refused American pre-trial discovery requests).
45. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555-56 ..
46. 107 S. Ct. at 2557.
4 7. 107 S. Ct. at 2558. The dissent later elaborated that "courts are generally ill-equipped to
assume the role of balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of our own [and that a] proforum bias is likely to creep into the supposedly neutral balancing process." 107 S. Ct. 2560.
48. 107 S. Ct. at 2558.
49. 107 S. Ct. at 2568.

Page 95: Summer 1987]
D.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO DISCOVERY CONFLICTS

103

The Deficiencies of Comparative Interest Balancing

Vagueness is but one of the many deficiencies inherent in comparative
interest balancing which render it an impractical approach to the problem of
extraterritorial discovery conflicts. A second major problem with comparative
interest balancing is that courts are simply unable to ascertain and to evaluate
accurately the interests of the foreign states that are to be weighed against
those of the United States. The Restatement (Second) requires an assessment
of the "vital national interests" of the foreign state, 50 and the Restatement
(Revised) calls for an inquiry as to "the extent to which compliance with an
order to produce the requested information would affect important
substantive policies or interests of the state. " 51 Yet, unlike the United States
Department of State, the judiciary possesses neither the special training nor
the resources necessary to analyze the economic, political, and social interests
that underlie a foreign state's policies of nondisclosure. Several courts have
acknowledged that the judiciary lacks the "institutional resources, " 52 the
expertise, and perhaps even the authority 53 to "adequately chart the
competing problems and priorities that inevitably define the scope of any
nation's interest in a legislated remedy. " 54
The Act of State doctrine presents a further barrier to the evaluation of the
foreign interests underlying blocking legislation.
The doctrine, which
prevents an American court from sitting in judgment of the public acts of
another country, 55 directly conflicts with the position taken by the
Restatement (Revised) that foreign "statutes that frustrate [discovery] need
not be given the same deference by courts of the United States as substantive
rules of law at variance with the law of the United States." 56 One court has
recently rejected this assertion by the Restatement (Revised), noting that it is
"somewhat presumptuous, to gauge the importance of the Blocking Statute to
France." 57 This view was also highlighted in recent litigation in which the
United Kingdom stated that it is as politically intolerable for leaders of foreign
democracies to have their official policies evaluated, balanced, and coerced by
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 40(a).
51. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note J, § 437 comment C.
52. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
53. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
54. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
55. The doctrine was first promulgated in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897),
where the Supreme Court declared:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment of the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory.
For a recent example of the doctrine's application, see Int 'I Ass 'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981 ), in which the court held that even where no sovereign state is
a party to the action, the Act of State doctrine prevents a federal court from questioning the
propriety of sovereign acts of foreign states such as the price setting activities of OPEC states.
56. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supm note I, § 437 reporter's note 5.
57. Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., IOI F.R.D. 503, 513 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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U.S. courts as it would be for American leaders to have important U.S.
policies and interests evaluated, judged, and coerced in foreign courts. sH
Even assuming domestic courts have the ability and authority to gauge
vital foreign interests, they cannot reliably and impartially balance the foreign
interests against those of the United States. In Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian
H'orld Airlines, 59 Judge Malcolm Wilkey of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
argued that domestic courts are incapable of sitting as international tribunals
and evenhandedly balancing national interests. He concluded that "courts
inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests. " 60
Given the vagueness of existing comparative interest balancing approaches, it
is small wonder that a court might be encouraged to assert the primacy of U.S.
interests. A court is likely to have difficulty, especially in a case involving U.S.
nationals, in denying jurisdiction, unless it can base its decision on a concrete
legal principle that clearly prohibits the exercise of such jurisdiction. 61
Comparative interest balancing provides no such concrete principle.
Finally, judicial use of comparative interest balancing is contrary to the
political question doctrine which removes certain issues from the scope of
judicial review. 62 In Baker v. Carr, 63 the Supreme Court extensively reviewed
the history and evolution of the political question doctrine and explained that
when the resolution of questions touching foreign relations turns on
standards that defy judicial application, or involves the exercise of discretion
demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature, such questions are
noqjusticiable political questions. 64 The preceding discussion has illustrated
that comparative interest balancing incorporates "purely political factors
which the court is neither qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of
properly balancing." 65 In his address to the American Bar Association in
August 1981, the Attorney General of Australia, Senator Peter Durack,
explained:
In my view, however, it is not feasible for a court of law applying judicial techniques to
balance the disparate interests of two States which they claim to be of national
importance ....

58. Joint Brief of United Kingdom and Cayman Islands at 16-20, In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia), No. 83-l (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 28, 1984), cited in Rosenthal &
Yeal-Loehr, supra note 16, at 1080.
59. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
60. !d. at 950-51.
61. Gerber, supra note 8, at 209.
62. See generally L. HENKIN, FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CoNSTITUTION 208-16 (1972). The
political question doctrine, which prevents judicial determination of political questions for which
courts lack competence, is to be contrasted with the Act of State doctrine, which is based on "the lack
of consent by foreign states to review of their actions by domestic courts of another state."
RESTATEMENT (REVISED). supra note l, § 428 reporter's note l.
63. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
64. !d. at 211, 217. Although Baker involved the issue of legislative reapportionment, its criteria
have subsequently been employed by countless courts identifying nonjusticiable political questions
in cases involving foreign relations. See, e.g., Cranston v. Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 24 7, 252 (D.D.C.
1985), and cases cited therein.
65. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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[I]t is not merely that the courts lack the expertise. It is rather that it is not part of
the judicial function to decide whether a law or policy is justified by what a court
conceives to be in the national interest. That is a political function. 6 G

Appraisal of the national interests of a foreign state is therefore more
appropriately a political rather than a judicial judgment. In accordance with
the political question doctrine, a court should refrain from subscribing to a
formulation whose standards are neither judicially discoverable nor
manageable.

III
PROPOSAL

Given the deficiencies inherent in comparative interest balancing, it is not
surprising that the analyses of the courts in cases involving discovery orders
and foreign nondisclosure laws have been inconsistent and confused. To
resolve the current confusion, and to simplify the task confronting a judge or
attorney in such cases, this note proposes a new framework in which to
examine the factors traditionally analyzed. In contrast to previous
approaches, this proposal does not require an assessment or balancing of
foreign interests. Rather, it requires a straightforward and unilateral
evaluation of domestic interests at the production stage of a trial.
Simply stated, under this proposal a court should issue an order for
discovery upon a finding that the requested information is directly relevant
and upon a further finding of any one of the following: (1) that the case
involves public rather than private law; (2) that the blocking statute is not an
actual barrier to production; or (3) that no reasonable good faith effort to
obtain the documents was made. Accordingly, a court should refrain from
ordering production, or issue a protective order preventing production, upon
a finding that the requested information is not directly relevant or a finding of
all of the following: (I) that the case involves private law; (2) that the blocking
statute presents an actual barrier to production; and (3) that a reasonable
good faith effort to obtain the documents was made. This formulation is
expressed as follows:

66.

Durack, supra note 8, at 48.

